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Instantaneous nonlocal quantum computation (INQC) evades apparent quantum and relativistic
constraints and allows to attack generic quantum position verification (QPV) protocols—aiming
at securely certifying the location of a distant prover—at an exponential entanglement cost. We
consider adversaries sharing maximally entangled pairs of qudits and find low-dimensional INQC
attacks against the simple practical family of QPV protocols based on single photons polarized at an
angle θ. We find exact attacks against some rational angles, including some sitting outside of the
Clifford hierarchy (e.g. pi/6), and show no θ allows to tolerate errors higher than ' 5 · 10−3 against
adversaries holding two ebits per protocol’s qubit.
I. INTRODUCTION
The interplay between quantum constraints on measure-
ments and relativistic effects is very subtle, as witnessed,
among others, by the famous Bohr–Einstein debate [1].
As early as 1931, Landau and Peierls [2] showed the
measurement of the electromagnetic field at a specific
location to be nonlocal and therefore deduced its impossi-
bility. However, in 1980 Aharonov and Albert [3] started
a line of research investigating how to harness entangle-
ment to perform non-local measurements and operations
without violating causality—a feat now called instanta-
neous nonlocal quantum computation (INQC); e.g. they
showed in 1981 [4] how to perform what we now call a
Bell measurement between two distant particles using an
entangled pair of qubits. These results were generalized
to other observables [5–9], until Vaidman showed in 2003
[10] how to approximate any nonlocal measurement using
teleportation [11] and causal classical communications.
In 2009 Chandran et al. [12] investigated a crypto-
graphic primitive known as position verification (namely,
the task of certifying a prover is at a specific location) ex-
ploiting timing constraints and the relativistic speed limit
on information propagation. Applications include encryp-
tion decipherable only at a specific distant location. They
showed this primitive to be insecure in the classical setting,
even under computational assumptions: a coalition of col-
luding adversaries mimicking the honest prover’s actions
can break any classical protocol by copying and sharing
the data sent by the verifiers. The following year,1 three
groups independently proposed quantum position verifica-
tion (QPV) protocols [14–19], building on the no-cloning
properties of quantum mechanics.
However, because of its universality [10], INQC turned
out to be a powerful tool to attack QPV protocols [19];
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1 We refer the reader interested in the involved history of the first
QPV protocol to [13]
their security is not unconditional, but is characterized
by the resources needed to perform the associated INQC
protocol. This prompted new, quantitative investigations
into INQC. Beigi and König used port-based teleporta-
tion [20] to reduce the entanglement cost of the universal
approximate attack [10, 19] from doubly exponential in
the number of used qubits to simply exponential. The
cost has been further reduced for the exact implemen-
tation of specific families of nonlocal unitaries, either in
the Clifford group [15, 21, 22], as well as operations finite
depth in the Clifford hierarchy [23, 24], and teleportation
routed according to distributed classical functions [25, 26].
Recently, Gonzales and Chitambar [22] improved the im-
plementation of arbitrary two qubit unitaries.
Security proofs for QPV have proven to be elusive,
with the notable exception of the hash-function based
protocol proposed by Unruh [27], which requires expo-
nentially many queries in the random oracle model. The
other published results correspond to lower bounds on the
amount of entanglement needed to spoof a QPV protocol
by INQC. Some protocols have initially been proven to
require entanglement [19], then security was extended
through entropic reasoning to lower bounds smaller than
one entangled pair per qubit [28]. While the improved
bound in [29] is tight for a simple protocol [15], it is still
exponentially far from the best known universal attack.
In this letter we focus on QPVθ, one of the simplest
protocol classes for QPV. This family of protocols is a
straightforward generalization of one of the first QPV
protocols, which was inspired by Bennett and Brassard’s
seminal quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol [30],
and has been used through most of the literature on
QPV. On a practical side, QPVθ would need a relatively
simple set-up, similar to what is currently being devel-
oped for free-space QKD [31–33] with stringent timing
constraints. Most protocols in QPVθ are resistant to
exact attacks from adversaries pre-sharing a maximally
entangled pair of qubits or qutrits [21]. It is therefore
natural to ask how well can attackers do on these near-
term protocols with entangled states of bigger (but still
of practical interest) dimension. On the theoretical side,
it will hopefully help to gain better insights into INQC:
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2tuning the single parameter θ allows us to explore the
Clifford hierarchy, greatly changing the cost of known
exact attacks [15, 22, 23]. More generally, known attacks
to various QPV protocols seem to hint towards a profound
link with deeper questions in quantum information, from
generalized teleportation schemes [25, 26, 34] to quantum
compilation of INQC unitaries [22–24].
Here, we study INQC protocols using a small amount
of entanglement through the attacks against QPVθ, pre-
sented in section II along with the attack model. We
describe, in section III, a new circuit representation of the
QPVθ protocols and use it in section IV to characterize
exact attacks exploiting entangled qudit pairs of dimen-
sion d ≤ 12, finding the most efficient INQC protocols to
date for many angles, including some out of the Clifford
hierarchy. In section V, we use it to numerically explore
the best approximate attacks for d ≤ 5.
II. PROTOCOL AND ATTACK MODEL
We constrain all parties to 1D space. We give a more
detailed definition and a simple attack in appendix A.
QPVθ protocol The verifiers control two stations V1
and V2 to the left and to the right of the prover’s claimed
position P (FIG. 1a). By making use of shared random
bits x, b ∈ {0, 1}, they prepare the qubit |ψ〉 = (Rθ)b |x〉
at V1, where
Rθ =
(
cos θ − sin θ
sin θ cos θ
)
θ ∈ [0, 2pi]. (1)
They then send |ψ〉 from V1 and b from V2, timed in such
a way to arrive simultaneously at P . The prover carries
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FIG. 1. Spacetime diagrams of QPVθ protocol and attack
model. Lines at 45° represent lightspeed quantum (ondulated)
and classical (straight, solid and dashed) channels. (a) When
a prover is present at P , he measures the quantum input in the
correct basis and broadcasts the measurement result x back
to V1 and V2. (b) Attackers have access to locations A and B
and share a quantum resource |Φ〉. They share the classical
outcomes of their measurements and attempt to reconstruct x
in time to be broadcast back to the verifier.
out a measurement on |ψ〉 in a suitable basis depending
on b and broadcasts the classical measurement result x
to V1 and V2, who check they received the correct bit at
the expected time. After repeating for multiple rounds,
they consider the position P authenticated if the prover
answered correctly often enough.
Attack model. The choice of the attack model, leading
us to new attacks, is inspired by the teleportation attack
for the BB84 protocol [15, 21] (appendix A3). The at-
tackers Alice and Bob have no access to the location P
to be authenticated, but control two stations A and B
respectively located between V1 and P and between P
and V2; a resource quantum state |Φ〉 is pre-shared be-
tween the two stations. Special relativity allows them one
round of simultaneous communication. As the protocol
requires them to output a classical message, we constrain
internal communication to be classical as well (LOBC
model, see [22]); limited quantum communication can be
included through teleportation. All quantum operations
are assumed to be unitary, as we focus mainly on the di-
mensionality d of |Φ〉: general CP maps can be extended
to unitary operators through a Stinespring dilation [35]
using only local resources. We choose |Φ〉 to be a max-
imally entangled qudit pair in order to exploit some of
its properties, noting that this choice leads to an optimal
attack for the BB84 protocol [29]. Finally, Alice and Bob
act identically and separately on each round.
This attack model translates to the INQC implementa-
tion of a special family of two-qubit nonlocal unitaries:
Uθ = CNOTAB (I ⊗ |0〉 〈0|+R−θ ⊗ |1〉 〈1|) , (2)
making it easier to compare it to known attacks, in par-
ticular the efficient ones in [22] (see appendix B).
III. CIRCUIT PICTURE
A precise representation of QPVθ, both with honest
and cheating provers, is described by the spacetime cir-
cuits [27] of FIG. 2. Alice and Bob’s strategy consists in
obtaining (clonable) classical information by interacting
their respective inputs with local resources, from which
they have to deduce x. Alice ignores the basis b in which
the incoming qubit (Rθ)b |x〉 is encoded, and her actions
are modeled by a unitary operation V ′ acting on both the
verifier’s qubit and her half of the entangled qudit pair,
followed by a measurement in the computational basis.
She forwards her outcome u ∈ Z2d to Bob.
Bob knows the basis b ∈ {0, 1} but has only access to
his half of the qudit pair, to which he applies a unitaryWb
followed by a measurement in the computational basis.
He obtains s ∈ Zd he forwards to Alice along with b.
Without loss of generality, we define UT := W1W
†
0 , with
Wb = (U
T)bW0; this allows to rewrite Bob’s unitary as
a fixed gate W0 followed by a gate UT conditioned on b.
The attack is then completed by a classical map f(b, s, u)
that they can both separately compute after exchanging
their measurement results.
3|x〉 (Rθ)b R†θ x
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FIG. 2. Circuit representation of the spacetime diagrams in
FIG. 1, where the actions of the verifier, prover and attackers
correspond here to the dashed boxes. The causal relations are
enforced by the wires between the boxes; the final broadcasting
of x is not represented.
Because |Φ〉 is maximally entangled we have
(I ⊗WTb ) |Φ〉 = (Wb ⊗ I) |Φ〉 , (3)
and we derive a formally equivalent circuit for the at-
tack, by transposing W0 and (UT)b to Alice’s side. In
this version the unitary WT0 U b is performed by Alice on
her half of the entangled state, while Bob immediately
measure his half. Setting V := V ′(I⊗WT0 ), we obtain the
reduced circuit of FIG. 3, in which |s〉 is the uniformly
distributed computational basis state onto which Alice’s
qudit is collapsed by Bob’s measurement. While this sim-
plified circuit gives a leaner description of the problem, it
does not preserve the spacetime locality of the operations:
in the real world, Alice has no access to b.
Let |ψb(x, s)〉 be the output state of the reduced circuit
before the measurement,
|ψb(x, s)〉 := V (Rθ ⊗ U)b(|x〉 ⊗ |s〉). (4)
In the following we analyze these states to investigate
exact and approximate attacks against QPVθ, respectively
succeeding with probability p = 1 and p < 1.
|ψb(x, s)〉2d
d
|x〉 (Rθ)b
V u
|s〉 (U)b
FIG. 3. The reduced circuit. It is no longer a spacetime cir-
cuit, but is equivalent to FIG. 2b when |s〉 is chosen uniformly
at random and V := V ′(I ⊗WT0 ). Bob’s measurement of his
qudit has been omitted.
b = 0 b = 1
FIG. 4. A pair of graphs describing an attack for d = 3
IV. EXACT ATTACKS
Alice and Bob can perform an exact attack if and only
if, when given b and s, measuring |ψb(x, s)〉 in the com-
putational basis {|u〉} is enough to determine x; namely,
the probability of any outcome u has to be zero for at
least x = 0 or x = 1. We refer to this requirement as the
deterministic distinguishability condition: for all u ∈ Z2d,
s ∈ Zd, b ∈ {0, 1},
〈u|ψb(0, s)〉 = 0 or 〈u|ψb(1, s)〉 = 0, (DDC) (5)
which is equivalent to 〈u|ψb(0, s)〉 〈ψb(1, s)|u〉 = 0. When
eq. (5) is satisfied, there naturally exists f(b, s, u) = x for
all inputs, giving an exact attack.
Through a custom representation of the output Hilbert
space in terms of hypergraph-inspired objects (FIG. 4),
we show in appendix C how to capture some of the restric-
tions imposed by the DDC. We use these new tools to
analytically characterize exact attacks for d = 2 and d = 3,
giving (arguably) simpler proofs for these cases than the
ones provided in [21]. The combinatorial explosion of
the above method fundamentally limits its application
to small d, even if improvements to d = 4 might not be
totally out of reach.
Other approaches are therefore needed: we chose to
pursue a numerical method. From the circuit reduction
of FIG. 3, all we need to define an attack is the pair of
unitary matrices (U, V ). Using eq. (4), the DDC may
in turn be written as a system of polynomial equations
in the entries of U , V and Rθ. We use a nonlinear least
squares method implemented in SciPy [36] to find zeros
of the system, as detailed in appendix E 1. For d = 4, we
quickly find solutions for all angles of the form θ = npi8 ,
showing that two ebits are strictly more powerful than
an entangled qubit or qutrit. We then proceed to raise
the dimension of the adversaries’ entangled qudits up
to d = 12; we collected our findings in TABLE I. An
interesting pattern emerges: for even d, we find an attack
for (at least) all θ of the form npi2d , and we conjecture this
d 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
k 4 2 8 4 8, 12 4 16 4, 6 20 4 24
TABLE I. New exact attacks for QPVθ. Depending on the
attack dimension d, we list the values of k for which a valid
pair (U, V ) breaking θ = npi
k
is found ∀n.
4relation to hold for all even d. Odd dimensions behave
differently and appear to be less powerful. Notably, we
find that a pair of maximally entangled six-level systems
is sufficient to break QPVpi/6, despite the corresponding
rotation being outside of the Clifford hierarchy on qubits.
Direct inspection of the matrices (U, V ) have not of-
fered us a straightforward generalization from which an
analytic attack strategy for all d could be derived. There
are a variety of discrete symmetries that are difficult to
tackle; furthermore, our numerical results suggest that
the solutions retain some continuous degrees of freedom.
For some d we present in appendix E 2 explicit solution
matrices, “reverse-engineered” from the numerical ones.
V. APPROXIMATE ATTACKS
While the previous method is appropriate to find new
exact attacks, more work is required to gather numerical
evidence about the (in)security of QPVθ against adver-
saries that are allowed a small probability of error.
As detailed in appendix E 3, the error probability for
an attack strategy is:
perr =
1
4d
∑
b,s,u
min
{| 〈u|ψb(0, s)〉 |2, | 〈u|ψb(1, s)〉 |2}. (6)
Minimizing over all attack strategies at fixed d,
perr(θ) = min
U,V
perr(U, V, θ), (7)
we determine an upper bound to the security of QPVθ.
Our results (methods in appendix E 3) are plotted in
FIG. 5 for d ≤ 5. We find a richer structure than what
could be expected from the regularity of the angles of
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FIG. 5. The numerically minimized perr(θ) for θ ∈ [0, pi4 ],
the other values of θ being deduced by symmetry. Horizontal
lines mark the maxθ of each curve. The d = 1 analytical curve
corresponds to no pre-shared entanglement.
TABLE I. As a nice consistency check, it can be seen that
perr drops to 0 where we would expect from the exact
results. The shape of the optimal perr(θ) curves appears
to be of the form min{p1(θ), p2(θ), . . . , pn(θ)}, suggesting
that Alice and Bob may have to employ radically different
strategies depending on θ.
d = 2 The adversaries share just one ebit. The curve
found numerically is well fit by
perr(θ) =
{
sin
(
θ
2
)2
0 ≤ θ ≤ pi8 ,
sin
(
θ
2 − pi8
)2 pi
8 ≤ θ ≤ pi4 .
(8)
Surprisingly, the probability in the region 0 ≤ θ ≤ pi8 can
be attained without using the ebit at all: a simple match-
ing strategy is the ubiquitous pretty good measurement
(PGM), where Alice can directly measure the unknown
|ψ〉 = (Rθ)b |x〉 in the intermediate basis Rθ/2 and send
the classical result to Bob in the broadcasting phase.
A strategy for the second region (pi8 ≤ θ ≤ pi4 ) can be
obtained by modifying the the teleportation-based exact
attack of appendix A3, giving the pair:
U = H, V = (Rpi
8− θ2 ⊗ I) CNOTAB (H ⊗ I). (9)
d = 3 The absence here of an exact attack for θ = pi4
is more clearly grasped in the approximate context. The
piecewise function perr(θ) seems to involve six curves, with
some strategies prevailing only in small regions of θ (e.g.
the ones flattening the “cusp” at θ/pi ' 0.11).
d = 4 With two ebits we count five distinct regions,
four of which fit to an expression of the type:
(1− t) sin
(
θ
2
− φ
)2
+
t
2
. (10)
Around θ ' pi8 and θ ' pi4 , where perr(θ) crosses the x axis,
we have t = 0 and respectively φ = pi16 , φ =
pi
8 . For both
d = 3 and d = 4 we find attacks slightly beating the non-
entangled PGM in the region around θ ' 0; however, for
this piece we could not find a simple analytical formula.
Multiple bases An interesting scenario is QPV(n), an
extension of QPVθ defined as such: the verifiers now
choose a basis Rθb , where θb is picked uniformly from
the set Sn = {bpi/2n, ∀b ∈ Zn}, and send |ψ〉 = Rθb |x〉
from V1 and b ∈ Zn from V2. The set Sn is composed
of n equally-spaced angles in the range [0, pi2 ); for n = 2,
QPV(n) reduces to QPVpi/4. The intuition behind the
modified protocol (similar to one suggested in [15]) is
that only Bob can adapt his unitary Ub depending on b,
making the constraints on Alice’s V tighter and tighter by
increasing n. Moreover, QPV(n) allows us to go beyond
a direct application of the efficient attacks devised in [22].
The numerical optimization (FIG. 6) indeed suggests a
higher perr(n) for large n than the maxθ perr(θ) for QPVθ.
The no-entanglement (d = 1) perr(n) can be obtained by
minimizing the sum of the squares of the overlaps between
a measurement angle θ˜ and the angles in Sn, giving:
min
θ˜
{
1
n
∑
θb∈Sn
sin
(
θ˜ + θb
)2}
=
1
2
[
1− 1
n
csc
( pi
2n
)]
.
(11)
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FIG. 6. The numerically minimized perr(n) representing
attacks to the QPV(n) protocol. For large n the best attacks
found are weaker than the ones for QPVθ.
VI. CONCLUSION
The family of protocols QPVθ explored in this paper
holds great promises for a near-term implementation, due
to its experimental and theoretical simplicity. However,
by exploiting its specific structure, we show how adver-
saries manipulating a small amount of entanglement are
able to perfectly break many angles, finding new exact
attacks and lowering the cost of previously known ones.
We find evidence about the existence of exact attacks for
θ multiples of pi2d , and numerically obtain them for d ≤ 12.
For comparison, attacks in [22] applied to QPVθ (the best
to date, as far as we know) require 4n+ 15 ebits to break
θ = pi/2n; our results suggest INQC protocols consuming
just n− 1 ebits for the corresponding family of two-qubit
nonlocal unitaries Uθ. Through numerical optimization
of approximate attacks, we show that adversaries manip-
ulating two ebits can attain error probabilities as low as
perr . 5 · 10−3 through the entire θ range.
Some questions about QPVθ are left open. It would
be interesting to find an explicit strategy reproducing
our attacks for all d. These results could be useful in
other areas, e.g. for designing better gate teleportation
protocols. Moreover, we note that a variant of QPV(n)
where the bases are chosen from the entire Bloch sphere
has interesting loss-tolerance properties [37], and could
be a better choice for near-term implementations. We
leave this to future work.
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7Appendix A: the QPVθ protocol and a simple attack
1. Protocol description
What follows is a description of QPVθ, a family of
protocols already introduced in [15, 21]. In order to
simplify the discussion, all parties are confined to 1D
space, i.e. on a line; see [21, 27] for extensions to D-
dimensional space. We further assume that the time
needed to perform computations is negligible with respect
to the travel time of the signals.
Before the start of the protocol, a prover publicly claims
to be at position P . Two verifiers, who distrust the prover,
would like to verify his claim. They thus pick two trusted
stations at position V1 and V2, respectively to the left
and to the right of P , and synchronize their clocks. One
round of the protocol then proceeds as follows (FIG. 1a):
1. V1 and V2 agree on two random bits x, b ∈ {0, 1}
by means of pre-shared randomness or through a
secure classical channel.
2. V1 prepares the state |ψ〉 = (Rθ)b |x〉, where
Rθ =
(
cos θ − sin θ
sin θ cos θ
)
(A1)
is a real rotation2 defining a new encoding basis for
|x〉.3 Then, |ψ〉 is sent towards P through a public
quantum channel.
3. V2 sends b towards P through a public classical
channel. The signals are carefully timed such that
the quantum state and the classical bit arrive simul-
taneously at P , where the prover claims to be. For
a moving prover, the signals are timed in his frame
of reference.
4. Upon receiving |ψ〉 and b, the prover applies (R†θ)b
to |ψ〉 and measures in the computational basis,
recovering x. He immediately broadcasts x to V1
and V2.
5. The verifiers receive the results, checks their correct-
ness and that the arrival timestamps of the signals
are consistent with the minimal travel time allowed
by relativity.
2 We choose θ to be the polarization angle, at variance with the
convention for a σy rotation in the Bloch sphere where the corre-
sponding angle would have been θ/2.
3 While this might seems restrictive, for any pair of transformations
B1 and B2 the verifier chooses to apply to the secret bit |x〉,
we can always find an equivalent protocol with B′1 = I and
B′2 = Rθ by setting cos(θ) = 〈0|B†1B2|0〉, such that (w.l.o.g.)
the four quantum inputs can be described by b, x ∈ {0, 1} as
|ψ〉 = (Rθ)b |x〉.
The above steps are repeated for N rounds. The protocol
terminates successfully if the answers to the challenges
have been accepted often enough, depending on a security
parameter ε > 0. According to the precision of their clock,
the verifiers can bound the prover’s position to a small
neighborhood of P .
2. Naïve security argument
In order to fool the timestamp verification step, any
attacker that does not control the neighborhood of P
would have to set up at least two stations A and B,
respectively between V1 and P and between V2 and P
(FIG. 1b). When all inputs are classical, each attacker
can copy its input and forward it to the other; then they
can follow the honest prover’s actions at both sites. It
becomes immediately clear that this strategy cannot work
in the quantum case, because the four possible states
|ψ〉 sent by the verifier are not in general all orthogonal
to each other—except for a “classical protocol”, where
θ = (0 mod pi2 ). Thus the quantum input cannot be
deterministically copied at A and sent to B. As it turns
out, if A and B do not share entanglement (the No-PE
model), the security of QPVθ can indeed be rigorously
proven [19].
3. Teleportation-based attack
Nonetheless, for θ = pi/4 the protocol can be broken
with unit probability by a strategy involving pre-shared
entangled states and the teleportation protocol. Already
in his seminal paper [15], Kent shows that QPVBB84 (anal-
ogous to QPVpi/4 within our notation) can be perfectly
broken by exploiting the commutation properties of the
standard teleportation correction operators. In this case,
the basis Rpi/4 chosen by the verifier has the peculiar prop-
erty that the honest prover’s actions on the teleported
state can be simulated at B before the end of the telepor-
tation protocol, i.e. without waiting for the usual classical
information from A telling B which correction operator
to apply to his quantum state in order to get |ψ〉. This
bears some resemblance to how error correction works in
measurement based quantum computation (MBQC) [39].
A way to see this is that the Pauli X, Z and XZ operators
keep the sets {|0〉 , |1〉} and {H |0〉 , H |1〉} invariant. The
teleportation-based attack strategy is efficient and has
been shown to be optimal in [29], consuming one ebit per
round.
Appendix B: QPVθ in the INQC picture
While our definition of the attack model is useful in the
circuit picture that we propose, an extensive part of the
literature [19, 22, 24, 34] on this topic characterises the
attacks through the (more general) INQC implementation
8of a suitable unitary UAB on a bipartite quantum input
ρAB sent by the verifiers. We establish here a mapping
from our model to the INQC one. In particular, we show
how the results in [22] apply to ours.
During a round of QPVθ, the adversaries receive the
quantum-classical [35] state:
|Ψb(x)〉AB = (Rθ)b |x〉A ⊗ |b〉B , (B1)
where x = 0, 1 and b = 0, 1 with equal probability 1/4. If
their goal was for just one of them to be able to obtain
|x〉, they could achieve it by implementing the controlled-
unitary
U˜θ = I ⊗ |0〉 〈0|+R−θ ⊗ |1〉 〈1| , (B2)
which leaves them with the state
|Ψ˜b(x)〉AB = |x〉A ⊗ |b〉B . (B3)
Alice could then measure his system in the computational
basis to obtain x. However, at this point they have already
used up the allowed round of simultaneous communication
to implement U˜θ, and Alice cannot send x to Bob.
The issue can be fixed by the addition of a CNOT gate
controlled on Alice’s side:
Uθ = CNOTAB U˜θ (B4)
leaving them with the state
|Ψ′b(x)〉AB = |x〉A ⊗ |x⊕ b〉B . (B5)
Now Bob is also able to retrieve x, by measuring in
the computational basis and XORing the result with b
(which is also available as a classical bit). An attack to
QPVθ can thus be equivalently described in terms of an
INQC implementation of the two-qubit unitary Uθ. An
analogous argument applies to the QPV(n) protocol with
n bases defined in section V, giving a unitary Un acting on
the (2⊗ n)-dimensional state |Ψb(x)〉AB = (Rθb |x〉)⊗ |b〉
for x ∈ {0, 1}, b ∈ Zn, θb ∈ Sn.
The protocol defined in [22] gives an INQC implementa-
tion of all two-qubit unitaries consuming a linear amount
of ebits in the desired approximation accuracy. Through
the embedding defined above, all QPVθ protocols can
be attacked in this way (but not QPV(n) when n > 2).
Matching their notation, their strategy is based on the
decomposition [40]:
U = (R1 ⊗ S1)Ω(R2 ⊗ S2), (B6)
where Ri, Si are single-qubit unitaries. The matrix
Ω = exp{i (ασx ⊗ σx + β σy ⊗ σy + γ σz ⊗ σz)} (B7)
describes the nonlocal part of U , and is diagonal in a
basis of maximally entangled states called magic basis.
While in general their strategy fails with some error, they
give in two special cases a perfect implementation of U ,
provided that α, β, γ are all integer multiples of pi/2n:
• If n = 2, consuming 2 ebits;
• If n > 2, consuming a finite number of ebits.
We can obtain the values of αθ, βθ, γθ for our Uθ through
the Cartan (also known as KAK) decomposition [41].
Choosing:
R1 =
I − iZ√
2
, S1 = Rpi/4,
R2 = R−θ/2, S2 =
Z − iI√
2
,
(B8)
we obtain a factorization of our Uθ in eq. (B4) in the form
of eq. (B6), with
αθ = 0, βθ = θ/2, γθ = pi/4. (B9)
For θ multiples of pi/2n a direct application of their strat-
egy gives an exact attack consuming 4n+ 15 ebits. The
attacks we found in section IV require, for n = 2, 3, 4,
respectively 1, 2, 3 ebit(s); moreover, we observe up to
d = 12 that an entangled qudit of even dimension is suffi-
cient to attack θ multiples of pi/2d, suggesting in this case
the existence of attacks for all n requiring just n− 1 ebits.
We emphasize though that the gain in ebit consumption
is likely due to the large amount of structure in the family
Uθ that we consider, motivated by the analysis of simple
protocols with only one quantum input, while the attacks
in [22] work for all two-qubit unitaries.
Appendix C: graphical no-go proofs for d = 2 and
d = 3 exact attacks
We introduce here a representation of the 2d-dimensio-
nal Hilbert space to which the states
|ψb(x, s)〉 = V (Rθ ⊗ U)b(|x〉 ⊗ |s〉) (4)
belong for all b, x, s. The visualization is loosely based
on hypergraphs, a generalization of graphs where an edge
is allowed to join any number of vertices. Additionally,
our edges are labelled—in particular, two different edges
can join the same subset of vertices. FIG. 4 in the main
text, as well as pairs (C4) to (C7) in the proof below, are
examples of the visualization:
• Each vertex represents an element |u〉 of the com-
putational basis. An edge joining a specific subset
of vertices represents a state |ψb(x, s)〉 having that
subset as its support.
• Each hypergraph has 2d vertices and d edges in the
inner (outer) region, where x = 0 (x = 1).
• The color of the edges encodes the different values
of the index s.
• To an attack strategy corresponds a pair of graphs,
one for b = 0 and one for b = 1.
9• Some information about the state is lost, e.g. the
actual amplitudes 〈u|ψb(x, s)〉 are not represented.
We can easily characterize the inner products between
the states in eq. (4): for all b, x, y ∈ {0, 1} and s, t ∈ Zd,
〈ψb(x, s)|ψb(y, t)〉 = δxyδst, (C1)
〈ψ0(x, s)|ψ1(y, t)〉 = 〈x|Rθ|y〉 〈s|U |t〉 . (C2)
In particular, the unitarity of Rθ, U, V implies that for
fixed b the vectors |ψb(x, s)〉 span the whole output space.
For an attack strategy to be exact it has to satisfy the
DDC:
〈u|ψb(0, s)〉 = 0 or 〈u|ψb(1, s)〉 = 0, (5)
for all u ∈ Z2d, s ∈ Zd, b ∈ {0, 1}. Phrased geometrically,
the states |ψb(0, s)〉 and |ψb(1, s)〉 need to have disjoint
supports in the computational basis. Eq. (5) has another
interesting consequence: either the protocol is classical
and trivially broken (i.e. θ ≡ 0 mod pi2 ), or the states|ψb(x, s)〉 have to satisfy∑
s
| 〈u|ψb(x, s)〉 |2 = 1
2
,
∀ b, x ∈ {0, 1},
∀u ∈ Z2d. (C3)
This last equation, proven in appendix D, has further
implications on the support of the states |ψb(x, s)〉.
The restrictions imposed by eqs. (C1) to (C3) can be
captured by the following necessary (but not sufficient)
structure on the graphs:
(I) Disjointness of |ψb(0, s)〉’s and |ψb(1, s)〉’s supports
implies that any vertex that is part of an s-colored
inner edge cannot also be part of the corresponding
s-colored outer edge.
(II) Eq. (C3), giving the total “probability budget” for
the inner (outer) edges crossing a given vertex, has
several graphical implications:
(a) All vertices have to be part of at least one
inner and one outer edge
(b) Vertices joined by an inner (outer) edge of
length 2 cannot be part of other inner (outer)
edges.
(c) Each edge has to join at least two vertices
and, due to property I, cannot join more than
2d− 2 vertices.
(III) Due to properties I and II, no vertex can be covered
by all inner edges or by all outer edges.
(IV) Per eq. (4), for fixed b, all states |ψb(x, s)〉 are
orthogonal to each other. This forbids any two
edges from having only one vertex in common.
(V) Finally, while a bit trickier to visualize, eq. (C2)
imposes that if an s-colored edge on the left graph
does not share any vertex with one of the t-colored
edges on the right graph, then all four edges of that
color combination (s, t) represent orthogonal states.
Using properties I to V we proceed to prove the follow-
ing result, already present in [21].
Theorem. Under the assumptions of our attack model
(section II), adversaries sharing a maximally entangled
qubit cannot perfectly break QPVθ unless θ is a multiple
of pi/4. A maximally entangled qutrit gives them even less
power: they can perfectly break only classical protocols,
namely θ multiple of pi/2.
Proof. For d = 2, we can quickly rule out most graphs.
As a matter of fact, for either one of the graphs forming
the pair describing the attack, property IIc leaves two
possibilities:
but property I rules out the second one. Up to vertex
reordering, two graph pairs are possible:
b = 0 b = 1
(C4)
b = 0 b = 1
(C5)
but property V on pair (C4) implies that the four top
edges (inner blue and outer orange on both graphs) would
correspond to four orthogonal states defined on the same
support of size 2. Thus only pair (C5) is a viable option.
Eq. (C3) then shows that in this configuration
| 〈ψ(0, x, s)|ψ(1, y, t)〉 | = | 〈x|Rθ|y〉 〈s|U |t〉 | = 1
2
for all x, y, s, t. This implies θ = npi4 and U = Rpi/4 up to
phases; we thus recover the result in [21] that adversaries
sharing an entangled qubit can only break QPVpi/4.
For d = 3 we start focusing only on the inner edges at
fixed b. We have to place three edges of length ranging
from 2 to 4, while satisfying properties I to IV. We are
left with six possibilities:
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When placing the outer edges (subject to the same rules),
we have to be careful to respect properties II and IV. We
are left with two non-trivial graphs:
We can rule out the second case by noticing that it implies
that three states (e.g. inner green and orange, outer blue)
are all orthogonal on a space of dimension 2, namely the
intersection of their supports. Drawing the possible full
pairs based on the first case, we obtain:
b = 0 b = 1
(C6)
b = 0 b = 1
(C7)
but property V applied to pairs (C6) and (C7) tells us
that either we have again too many orthogonal states on a
support of size two, or that two states are orthogonal over
a support intersection of size one. In both cases we have a
contradiction, so there is no exact attack to QPVθ for any
nontrivial θ for adversaries sharing an entangled qutrit,
confirming the result in [21] and proving the theorem.
Unfortunately, this method shows its limitations when
applied to the d = 4 case. With the help of a program,
we enumerated all graphs where properties I to IV are
satisfied, along with some more refined conditions. For
fixed b, we were able to get the possible configurations
of inner edges down to about a thousand, and we could
single out 18 of them that admit at least one compliant
set of outer edges. However the number of valid pairs that
can be produced with them is too big to handle manually,
even when using property V. A more careful analysis of
the DDC could give tighter rules, allowing to reduce the
possible pairs to a manageable number.
Appendix D: proof of eq. (C3)
We now prove that when eq. (5) (the DDC) is imposed
on a non-classical protocol, namely θ 6≡ 0 (mod pi2 ), the
states |ψb(x, s)〉 defined in eq. (4) satisfy the relation (C3),
recalled below ∑
s
| 〈u|ψb(x, s)〉 |2 = 1
2
(C3)
for all b, x ∈ {0, 1} and u ∈ Z2d.
Proof. The families of vectors {|u〉}, {|ψ0(x, s)〉} and
{|ψ1(y, t)〉} form three orthonormal bases of the same
space of dimension 2d. We can expand |ψ1(y, t)〉 in the
{|ψ0(x, s)〉} basis, obtaining ∀y ∈ {0, 1},∀t ∈ Zd:
|ψ1(y, t)〉 =
∑
x,s
〈ψ0(x, s)|ψ1(y, t)〉 |ψ0(x, s)〉
=
∑
x,s
(〈x| ⊗ 〈s|)V †V (Rθ |y〉 ⊗ U |t〉) |ψ0(x, s)〉
=
∑
x,s
〈x|Rθ|y〉 〈s|U |t〉 |ψ0(x, s)〉, (D1)
where we used eq. (C2) in the second step. For brevity,
we define the scalar ψu,b(x, s) := 〈u|ψb(x, s)〉. The DDC
can thus be seen as imposing
ψu,b(0, s)ψ
∗
u,b(1, s) = 0, (D2)
∀u ∈ Z2d,∀s ∈ Zd and ∀b ∈ {0, 1}. Projecting eq. (D1)
onto |u〉, for all y ∈ {0, 1}:
ψu,1(y, t)
=
∑
x,s
〈x|Rθ|y〉 〈s|U |t〉ψu,0(x, s) (D3)
=
∑
s
〈s|U |t〉 [〈0|Rθ|y〉ψu,0(0, s) + 〈1|Rθ|y〉ψu,0(1, s)] ,
substituting y = 0 and y = 1:
ψu,1(0, t) (D4)
=
∑
s
〈s|U |t〉 [cos(θ)ψu,0(0, s) + sin(θ)ψu,0(1, s)] ,
ψu,1(1, t) (D5)
=
∑
s
〈s|U |t〉 [cos(θ)ψu,0(1, s)− sin(θ)ψu,0(0, s)] .
Using the DDC (D2) for b = 1
ψu,1(0, s)ψ
∗
u,1(1, s) = 0, (D6)
along with eqs. (D4) and (D5), we obtain:
0 =
∑
s,s′
〈s|U |t〉 〈s′|U |t〉∗
· [cos(θ)ψu,0(0, s) + sin(θ)ψu,0(1, s)]
· [cos(θ)ψ∗u,0(1, s′)− sin(θ)ψ∗u,0(0, s′)] .
(D7)
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Summing over t gives:
0 =
∑
s,s′
(∑
t
〈s|U |t〉 〈t|U†|s〉
)
· [cos(θ)ψu,0(0, s) + sin(θ)ψu,0(1, s)]
· [cos(θ)ψ∗u,0(1, s′)− sin(θ)ψ∗u,0(0, s′)] ,
(D8)
and since
∑
t |t〉〈t| = I and 〈s|s′〉 = δss′ , we have
0 =
∑
s
[
cos(θ)ψu,0(0, s) + sin(θ)ψu,0(1, s)
]
· [cos(θ)ψ∗u,0(1, s)− sin(θ)ψ∗u,0(0, s)] . (D9)
With the DDC for b = 0, this simplifies to
cos(θ) sin(θ)
(∑
s
|ψu,0(1, s)|2 −
∑
s
|ψu,0(0, s)|2
)
= 0 .
Now we make use of the assumption of non-classicality
of the protocol, namely θ 6≡ 0 (mod pi2 ), ensuring thus
cos(θ) sin(θ) 6= 0. With the previous equation and the
normalization of |u〉, expressed in the {|ψ0(x, s)〉} basis:∑
s
|ψu,0(0, s)|2 +
∑
s
|ψu,0(1, s)|2 = 1, (D10)
it implies that∑
s
|ψu,0(0, s)|2 =
∑
s
|ψu,0(1, s)|2 = 1
2
. (D11)
Writing now |ψ0(x, s)〉 in the {|ψ1(y, t)〉} basis and fol-
lowing the whole calculation again, we finally obtain∑
s
|ψu,b(x, s)|2 = 1
2
(D12)
for all u ∈ Z2d and b, x ∈ {0, 1}, when θ 6≡ 0 (mod pi2 ).
Appendix E: numerical methods
1. Exact attacks
The DDC can be equivalently written as:
〈u|ψb(0, s)〉 〈ψb(1, s)|u〉 = 0. (E1)
We can obtain polynomial equations from eq. (E1) using
the definition of the states |ψb(x, s)〉 in eq. (4),
|ψb(x, s)〉 := V (Rθ ⊗ U)b(|x〉 ⊗ |s〉), (4)
by writing Ust for 〈s|U |t〉, Vu,xs for 〈u|V (|x〉 ⊗ |s〉) and
Rxy for 〈x|Rθ|y〉:
0 = V ∗u,0sVu,1s , (E2)
0 =
(∑
ij
Vu,ijRi0Ujs
)(∑
kl
V ∗u,klRk1U
∗
ls
)
. (E3)
Matrices U and V solving the above equations describe an
attack if and only if they are unitary; they have therefore
to also satisfy:
d∑
k=1
U∗k,iUk,j = δij ∀i, j ∈ Zd, i ≥ j, (E4)
2d∑
k=1
V ∗k,iVk,j = δij ∀i, j ∈ Z2d, i ≥ j. (E5)
Strictly speaking, these constraints are not polynomial
equations as they involve complex conjugation; still, they
can be expressed as polynomials in the real and imag-
inary parts of U and V ’s entries. In order to simplify
the problem and reduce the number of variables, we re-
strict our search to attacks that can be written as real
orthogonal matrices. Results on the approximate attacks
in section V suggest that this is not too restrictive, as
detailed in footnote 4. Assuming real variables, eqs. (E2)
to (E5) consist of
2d2 + 2d2 +
d(d+ 1)
2
+
2d(2d+ 1)
2
=
13d2 + 3d
2
(E6)
equations of the form fi(U, V ) = 0 in d2 + (2d)2 = 5d2
scalar variables, parametrized by θ. It should be noted
however that not all these constraints are independent:
for example, eq. (E2) already implies the orthogonality
of d columns of V .
While computational algebraic tools for working with
symbolic polynomial equations are available, their inher-
ent exponential scaling makes them challenging to apply
directly to our system, for which the smallest interest-
ing case (real matrices, d = 4) involves 80 variables and
174 equations. For example, techniques involving sum of
squares (SOS) proofs [42] construct a hierarchy of SDPs
such that any feasible point provides a certificate of un-
solvability of the system (and is guaranteed to be found at
some level of the hierarchy). It should be noted that such
approaches can be unsuccessful when applied as is, and
may prove more effective by taking some of our problem’s
symmetries into account, e.g. the freedom in assigning
an order to the states labeled by x, s and to the basis
elements {|u〉}.
Even if the system looks heavily overdetermined, we
know it has at least a trivial solution for all d, namely
when the protocol is classical (θ = 0 mod pi2 ). In the
following, we will tacitly ignore those. In order to look
for other solutions, we define:
F =
∑
i
f2i , (E7)
i.e. the sum of the squares of all polynomials. The zeros
of the function in eq. (E7) are also simultaneous zeros
of all the polynomials fi. We can minimize F with a
numerical method; if we find zero as minimum, we have
found an exact attack. In order to look for zeros of F ,
we leveraged a nonlinear least-squares method provided
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by the Python library SciPy [36]. We could find many
new solutions, up to d = 12: the results are collected in
TABLE I of section IV.
2. Explicit solutions
The following block matrices U and V are examples
of explicit exact attacks we found via inspection of the
results of the numerical optimization.
For d = 4, θ = pi/8, we provide two non-trivially
equivalent attacks:
V =
1
2

X I −Z ZX
ZX X I Z
X −I −Z −ZX
ZX −X I −Z
 (E8)
U =
1√
2
(
R−pi/8 Rpi/8 Z
ZRpi/8 R−pi/8
)
, (E9)
and
V =
1√
2

XHX 0 0 I
0 −XHX −I 0
ZX 0 0 H
0 −ZX −H 0
 (E10)
U =
1√
2
(
Rpi/8 R−pi/8 Z
ZR−pi/8 Rpi/8
)
. (E11)
For d = 6, θ = pi/12, we found:
V =
1
2

I ⊗√2Rpi/6 0
0
X ⊗√2R−pi/3 0
0
H ⊗ I −Z
X
−ZH ⊗X −X
Z
H ⊗ I Z−X −ZH ⊗X
X
−Z

(E12)
U =

A − 12ZH 13−√3ZX
B 12ZH
1
3+
√
3
ZX
1√
6
Rpi/12
1√
2
Rpi/12
1√
3
ZH
 , (E13)
where
A =
2−√3√
24
ZX − 1
2
√
2
I, (E14)
B =
1
2
√
2
XZ − 2 +
√
3√
24
I. (E15)
The above is a special case of a continuum of solutions
with one real degree of freedom.
3. Approximate attacks
Using the notation of section III, we have that ∀x, b a
measurement result of s, u occurs with probability
p(x, b, s, u) = | 〈u|ψb(x, s)〉 |2 p(x) p(b) p(s). (E16)
Alice and Bob’s best guess for the value of x is thus
psucc(b, s, u) = max
x
p(x, b, s, u), (E17)
their probability of error being perr = 1 − psucc. As our
protocol only involves qubits, namely x ∈ {0, 1}, we have
perr(b, s, u) = min{p(0, b, s, u), p(1, b, s, u)}. (E18)
The overall error probability for an attack strategy can be
obtained by summing over b, s, u and remembering that
x, b and s are uniformly distributed:
perr =
1
2 · 2 · d
∑
b,s,u
min
{| 〈u|ψb(0, s)〉 |2, | 〈u|ψb(1, s)〉 |2}.
(E19)
Imposing the DDC (eq. 5) we have perr = 0, as expected
of exact attacks.
From the point of view of the numerical optimization,
perr is a function of θ and of the (unitary4) matrices (U, V )
defining an attack. We seek to minimize it over all attack
strategies at fixed d:
perr(θ) = min
U,V
perr(U, V, θ). (E20)
Symmetries allow to restrict the relevant values of θ to
[0, pi4 ], through the relations Rpi2−θ = XRθZ and R−θ =
XRθX, along with similar ones for the other quadrants.
Extra X and Z are either absorbed into V or taken
into account by the adversaries by flipping the bit x.
At variance with the exact attacks, we want to obtain
evidence about the global minimum of the continuous
function (E19). Scalable (non-convex) numerical methods
can only provide local minima [43], but we can repeat
the optimization with thousands of uniformely sampled
starting points, keeping the best optimum (a strategy
sometimes referred to as multistart). The shape of the
search space can heavily affect the effectiveness of this
method, so we carry out the optimization in three different
ways:
• A constrained sparse interior point method [44]
(IPOPT), by imposing the unitarity constraints in
eqs. (E4) and (E5).
4 At variance with the exact attacks in section IV, we have to ex-
plore the whole (complex) unitary space for us to obtain sensible
bounds over a range of parameters, as only looking to orthogonal
matrices makes little sense from a security standpoint. Nonethe-
less, when restricting to the (much faster to optimize) orthogonal
group we obtain the exact same results and curves; this may be
due to symmetries in our attack model—for example, (U, V ) and
(U∗, V ∗) are both attacks with the same perr.
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• An unconstrained quasi-Newton method [45] (L-
BFGS), by parametrizing U and V with the skew-
hermitian matrices AU and AV through either:
– the Cayley transform [46, 47]
U = (I +AU )
−1(I −AU ),
V = (I +AV )
−1(I −AV ),
(with some care about the exceptional points)
– the exponential map U = eAU , V = eAV .
When possible, the analytical gradient of perr with respect
to the optimization variables is obtained in order to speed
up the computation. The three methods give compara-
ble results, requiring for example between 104 and 105
starting points for d = 4 in order to converge to the same
optimum. The results of the minimization are presented
in section V.
